Shibboleth Identity Provider upgrades

After some slight prompting by both the Networks team and colleagues in Sysdev, the IAM team felt that we should write some blog posts of our own about our own work to upgrade the University’s authentication infrastructure.  The first of these is on our work to upgrade the Shibboleth service.  This work ensures that we are running a fully-supported version of Shibboleth, as well as enabling new features in the future, such as single log-out.  The upgrade will also make our Shibboleth servers highly available, which should improve service reliability, and allow us to consolidate our existing servers to an extent.

The upgraded service will go live on the 5th April after much testing over the past few months.  No Shibboleth-protected services should be affected by this work, and the upgrade should be transparent to end users.

What is Shibboleth?

Shibboleth currently sits at the top of Oxford’s Single Sign-On (SSO) stack, on top of both Kerberos and Webauth.  The original purpose of Shibboleth was to extend SSO to services outside the University, such as journal access.  However, Shibboleth is also frequently used for services within the University as well, not least to provide SSO to systems that lack support for Webauth.  Although Windows servers are the most common case of servers without Webauth support, other systems such as Bradford Campus Manager also fall within this group.  Shibboleth is based on the idea of “claims-based authentication” using SAML, where a Service Provider (or SP) is given a signed “assertion” from a trusted Identity Provider (IdP).  This assertion contains details (known as attributes) about the end-user such as username, name and email address that can then be used to make decisions about access.

For Shibboleth to work, the IdP and SP need to know certain details about each other, such as where they may be found and the certificates used for signing assertions.  This information is known as the metadata for a given server.  It is possible to share this manually between the two servers if needed, but when this is scaled up to a large number of services and identity providers it becomes unwieldy to manage the metadata swapping.  To solve this problem, Shibboleth servers generally have their metadata published by one or more “federations”, which act as a single trusted source of metadata.  The individual Shibboleth servers then fetch signed metadata from the federations they trust.

Since Shibboleth may be used to login to many different SPs with varying levels of trust, the software is privacy-preserving by default.  This means that attributes that could be used to identify end users must be explicitly “released” to a given service provider.  This means that instead of a normal username, services are typically presented with an opaque persistent ID, which is generated by a one-way hash of the service provider’s “entityID” (an identifier for that particular identity or service provider) and the Oxford SSO username.  This prevents separate SPs working together to de-anonymise users.

Why upgrade Shibboleth?

About a year ago, we received the news that updates and support for version 2 of the Shibboleth Identity Provider (IdP) server would be discontinued by July 2016.  This meant that we had to start work on migrating to the new version of the software (IdP v3), since running supported software is a good idea.

In addition to the obvious desire to run a supported version of the IdP software, the upgrade also means we can make resiliency improvements.  At present, almost all Oxford Shibboleth authentication is handled by a single server.  This is mostly down to the difficulties in setting up an IdP v2 cluster, but is also down to avoidance of load-balancers in the past.  (For historical reasons, there is also a completely separate IdP pair that is used for some internal business systems, with manual switching between the two servers.)  However, the popularity of Shibboleth for new services means that the current single point of failure is no longer a sensible option today.  The IdP v3  software is also rather easier to cluster than the previous version, and no longer requires a complicated state-sharing mechanism for clustering.

Finally, the upgrade process provides an opportunity to consolidate our existing Shibboleth environments.  Currently, we have three environments, which look like the following:

  • Main IdP
    • Live (1 server)
    • Test IdP (1 server)
    • Development (1 server)
  • Business Systems IdP
    • Live (2 servers)
    • Test (1 server)
  • IAM test stack (1 server)

As mentioned earlier, we have historically run a separate IdP for business systems that required a high-availability authentication service.  However, as the upgrade will bring high-availability features to the main IdP, we should be able to remove the additional environment:

  • Main IdP
    • Live (3 servers)
    • Test IdP (2 servers)
    • Development (1 server)
  • IAM test stack (1 server)

While the total number of servers is identical, the elimination of the two business systems environments improves manageability of the service.

Load balancing and improving resiliency

The new service uses the Netscaler load-balancing device run by the Business Systems Operations Team, which is also used by WebLearn and other services.  The Netscaler supports both session stickiness (necessary for avoiding server switches mid-authentication) and content-based switching, which is useful for allowing users to choose between old and new servers as well as separating out SAML1 and SAML2 requests for testing.  For services using SAML2, the attributes are transferred between the IdP and SP via the end-user’s browser.  However, in the case of SPs using SAML1, the SP must contact the IdP directly via a back-channel to obtain attributes.  All the necessary state is stored on the client side, so no shared server state is required.  The only exception to this is the authentication process, which must be performed on a single server.

One interesting question is how the IdP maps an attribute query to the back-channel to SAML1 authentication request to the front-channel.  The answer is that the front-channel returns a transient ID which is reversibly encrypted.  The back-channel process then decrypts this transient ID to find out which user the request applies to.

Problems we saw

While the process of upgrading was slow, there were relatively few problems during the upgrade process.  In several cases, the upgrade to IdP v3 improved compatibility with external services.  For example, some service providers require particular types of authentication or require certain forms of user identifier to define the “subject” of an assertion.  However, there were some problems that we saw during the upgrade.


The first problem was how to test service providers that still use the old SAML1 protocol.  Because these servers communicate directly with the IdP to retrieve attributes, it is generally difficult to test whether these behave as intended with the new service.  The solution we came up with was to test specific development servers against the new IdP cluster, before testing external systems later in the rollout process.  Ideally, we would have tested external sites with a separate test IdP.  Unfortunately, some providers set strict limits on the number of IdPs that can be trusted (often 1) for a given organization, which makes this impossible.

Assertion signature algorithm

Another problem we saw was a lack of support for assertion signatures based on SHA-2.  This is fairly rare, but affected one relatively important Service Provider: the cloud-based software used by our centralised helpdesk.  While some may consider a lack of visible queries to answer a good thing at times, the Service Desk team may beg to differ!  We fixed this by modifying relying-party.xml, as documented in the Shibboleth wiki:

<!-- SHA-1 support bean -->
<bean id="SHA1SecurityConfig" parent="shibboleth.DefaultSecurityConfiguration"
  p:signatureSigningConfiguration-ref="shibboleth.SigningConfiguration.SHA1" />

<util:list id="shibboleth.RelyingPartyOverrides">
  <bean parent="RelyingPartyByName" c:relyingPartyIds="entityID here">
    <property name="profileConfigurations">
        <bean parent="SAML2.SSO" p:securityConfiguration-ref="SHA1SecurityConfig" />

Persistent IDs

The third issue we saw concerned our generation of opaque persistent IDs, which include an IdP-specific salt value.  This is needed so that SPs cannot trivially reverse the persistent ID by brute force.  For historical reasons, we use a random binary salt as opposed to the text-based salt more typically used, and accommodating this required some minor modifications to the IdP software.

Additional Verification

The final problem we saw was with the Additional Verification service, which provides multi-factor authentication.  Although this service is rather limited at present, Additional Verification is currently used by WebLearn to protect examination setting and marking.  The service is currently based on a custom-written Java servlet that sends one-time codes via text message.  As the new IdP version changed the authentication interfaces used, the servlet required some modifications to work correctly.  As a side-effect, the service was also restyled to match the current Webauth service.

The roll-out process

We started the process on the 8th March by placing our existing IdP behind the Netscaler load balancer.  The existing server kept its IP address, but the DNS entries were modified to point at the load balancer.  The reason we did this was to avoid problems with SPs that use the older SAML1 protocol, which include several journals and library resources, along with the Bodleian’s SOLO portal and this blog.  Since some SPs cache DNS responses for up to seven days, a grace period is needed to make sure that the back-channel and front-channel connections both use the load balancer.

Netscaler setup before IdP v3 go-live

Netscaler setup before IdP v3 go-live (courtesy of Julian)

The next step was to test that services using the old SAML1 protocol still worked using the new servers.  On the 22nd March, we temporarily switched requests for SAML1 authentication (including back-channel requests) to the new servers during the maintenance window.  This let us test that the new servers worked as intended with external journals, and confirmed that the sites worked.

The final step will be to switch traffic from the old IdP server to the new cluster.  Barring any last-minute problems, this will happen on the 5th April during the 7 a.m.-9 a.m. maintenance window, which will allow us time to test the new service and revert back if anything does go wrong. The resulting Netscaler setup will look like this:

Netscaler setup after IdP v3 go-live

Netscaler setup after IdP v3 go-live (courtesy of Julian)

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Stardev Syswars: The Advent Menace

The days have been glorious; the force lit the world and provided bounty and delight for all. All things have their time. The evenings have turned to the darkside and enforced merriment pervades the air at Tesco. It can only mean that winter is upon us once again.

As regular readers will remember, it is a long standing tradition that sysdev gets a Lego StarWars advent calendar. This year is no different (and, actually, the first door was opened by Adrian yesterday — more on that later). The rules remain the same, one day, one door, one brave Jedi to do battle with fiddly little pieces of plastic, and one photo of their finished masterpiece appended to this post.

So, onwards to victory …

1st December 2015.

Adrian’s landing ablationator is first ashore in a heroic rush, but he’s torn between the red-wrapped treat on the right and the orange one on the left. Adrian will learn to pay attention to the road ahead…


2nd December 2015

Word reached us that an army of Trandoshan bounty hunters were on the prowl .. and could very well reach Camp Gaderffii within hours .. We quickly readied the  Multi-Projectile OzBlop J-24 and beamed it up to a vantage position with its 4 x ZZ14 Rocket Systems facing 4 possible approach directions

Multi-Projectile OzBlop J-24

3rd December 2015


4th December 2015 (Dameon)

Utini! It looks like the pesky little Jawas have turned up to try and steal all the presents … luckily they haven’t been bought yet!


5th December 2015 (Robert)

This is not the sand crawler you are looking for…


6th December 2015

My first Lego Star Wars calendar – ever! I’m told this is probably a Ewok turret of some kind.

photo 1

7th December 2015

No idea what I have built here, I’m confused but then that’s war for you. Perhaps it will cause the Trandoshan bounty hunters to think on’t.  I’ll tell them it’s a present form Darth Santa and leg it to the Pub, I’m in need of some Dagobah swamp water.

photo 1

8th December 2015

This is an Ewok! The first piece apart from the Jawa that I actually recognise despite having watched all three original films.

photo 2

9th December 2015

The Ewok is happy now he’s got his boulder catapult loaded. Don’t let those glazed eyes deceive you – he can take out a Stormtrooper’s helmet at 30 Wookiee strides. Once he’s run out of boulders the catapult will make an excellent present delivery mechanism to the tree tops.


10th December 2015

This Stormtrooper seems to have stolen a bow and arrow and is creeping up on an oblivious Ewok.


11th December 2015

A Star Destroyer ‘jacked by joyriders hurtles past the diorama. Remember kids, Speed Kills. And Merry Christmas!


12th December 2015 (Robert)

You can never have too many weapons racks…

Weapons rack

13th December 2015

Bender makes a cameo appearance and cannot resist goosing a stormtrooper. “Ooh ooh ooh ooh. Can you feel the Force?”  That stormtrooper soon will.


14th December 2015

If you look very carefully, you’ll see the millenium vulcan swooping in at 3 parsecs below the speed of light, about to wreak havoc upon the land.
(cameraman: adrian. director, producer and pilot-stuntman: dave).
Hang on, wasn’t vulcan from another story? Dave, I thought you said vulcan!


15th December 2015

Small 20151223_163109.mp4

16th December 2015

A trigger happy Sleazebaggano on watch duty and sat in a grounded Alderaan Y-Wing Starfighter  blasts out a wrapped xmas present with a proton torpedo when the electronic toy inside makes a squeak .. oops!!! someone will be without a xmas present .. Too right, no more watch duty for Sleazebaggano  ..

Alderaan Y-Wing Starfighter

Alderaan Y-Wing Starfighter


17th December

The Hoth Rebel Trooper looks rather bemused at the lack of snow – clearly, Hoth is also having a very mild winter.


18th December

Imperial Walker just minding its own business…


19th December

Rebel Ion Canon

Rebel Ion Canon

Traverse Right!  Steady on!  1 … 500!  Oops, wrong film.  I’m sure the Beatles don’t mind.  A rebel ion canon looses a volley at the Imperial Walker.

20th December

I don’t know what it is but it doesn’t look good.  We need courage, pass the Dagobah swamp water.


Ah!  That’s better, I think I may ask it if it would care to dance.altered-photo20

21st December

Activity is seen in the hills.  All guns!  All guns!  Fire at will!  No, no, Fire at will, not Fire at Will!  Stop firing!  Stop firing!

Look carefully and you can just make out the shot being fired off.  I should have made an annoying animated GIF instead, I know

Look carefully and you can just make out the shot being fired off. I should have made an annoying animated GIF instead, I know


22nd December

R2-Deer2 and his mate turn up late for the party. The Dagobah swamp fumes have livened their circuits and they start a bout of rutting around the Pit (of Carkoon) whilst the Stormtrooper cheers on.


23rd December 2015 (Dameon)

Swoosh! This guy simply HAS to be the droid I’m looking for … Help me R2-Deer2, Vader must be near, I can feel his presents!

24th December 2015

And finally! Santa3P0, with a sack containing a taun-taun of presents, lands at last in his sleigh, pulled by the red-nosed R2Deer2.

(mutters) “It’s against my programming to impersonate Santa Claus”

All the boys and girls wait patiently, keeping Luke warm near the fire.

“Hello, boys and girls, I’m terribly sorry but you’re doomed, the possibility of a child being good all year round is approximately 32,700 to 1.”

(cue sad faces) 

“But here are your presents anyway”

(Fade to cheers from the assembled throng)


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Kerberos upgrades: kdc-admin

kdc-admin is the master server in our Kerberos realm – it’s the server that account changes happen on, and where password resets happen. The data is then propagated to the slave KDCs every 5 minutes. Upgrading this critical system will be the first stage in improving our Kerberos infrastructure.

Note that Kerberos-specific terms and acronyms should be covered in the first blog post in this series. If there’s anything that’s not explained there, please do leave a comment and I’ll try and explain things better.

It’s about time!

kdc-admin is rather overdue an upgrade for various reasons. Its operating system is not as supported as we would like, and to get various features we need we’ve had to backport a version of Kerberos from a newer version of Debian. Maintaining this is extra overhead we’d be quite happy to get rid of.  There are also newer versions of Kerberos available that would give us other features we would like (indeed, one of them we require for our DES deprecation plan). The current kdc-admin also lives in our Banbury Rd data centre, rather than the University’s shared data centre (an altogether nicer space for servers, not to mention the fact that the Banbury Rd data centre is likely to be replaced in the next 2 years or so).

In many ways, upgrading the Kerberos servers is fairly easy; kdc-admin is definitely the most complex.  This is because all the others (,,, are read-only slaves, and unless you have only one of them defined in your krb5.conf (which the Kerberos libraries use to work out which host(s) to connect to) we can take one offline with no-one noticing.  Kerberos will happily accept multiple KDCs defined in krb5.conf, or will look at SRV records in DNS, to find which KDC to talk to, and it will iterate through until it finds one that works.  (I haven’t heard of any implementations that only take a single KDC, although I fear there may be such creatures out there somewhere.)

What’s involved?

So, what is involved in upgrading kdc-admin?  Well, we first need to build a test server and run it against our TEST.OX.AC.UK Kerberos realm.  This lets us check some useful things such as whether our tools still work with the upgraded version of Kerberos (have any arguments changed names?  Are we explicitly specifying encryption types that don’t exist?); whether configuration files will need updating; whether packages have changed name or dependency, and so on.  For example, for various reasons we synchronize passwords to Nexus using the krb5-sync plugin[1].  Since the currently-running kdc-admin was installed, the plugin has been packaged for Debian and is supported by the kadmin daemon.  This means that we can drop our custom packaging of it, and simply make sure it gets installed on the new system, and the appropriate snippet of new configuration is in place.

We’ve built the test server, and ironed out a few problems that we discovered (mostly relating to configuration and packages changing).  There were a few issues with replicating to the test slave, but after we built a new slave that was more consistent with the existing ones we found they disappeared.

We’ve also tested the password synchronization – right now I know that when I reset a password on a test account in the TEST.OX.AC.UK realm it is propagated to Nexus[2].

Going live

Once we’re happy with the testing, we can think about installing the live server.  Normally when we run services, we add them as extra interfaces on the server (so we might have as the server, with an extra IP to host Generally we’ll install a new server and migrate the service interface across when we’re ready to go live.  Unfortunately, Kerberos service operation is inextricably linked to the name of the host – in this case, – so we have to keep the name of the server the same.  (This is because the server name gets encoded in various places, and Kerberos doesn’t really do multiple interfaces with different names very well, so odd things break.)  This means that we will actually have to install the server with a test name, but have all the kdc-admin configuration (including Kerberos principals) also in place on the server.  When it comes to time to go live, we simply rename the server.

For those who like sysadmin checklists, the general process will look something like:

  • Install new server with temporary name on new IP address (,
  • Ensure TTLs on kdc-admin are low (300s)
  • Ensure server has appropriate kdc-admin configuration
  • Ensure server has appropriate kdc-admin Kerberos keytabs (by copying from the existing kdc-admin[3])
  • Securely[4] copy the Kerberos stash file[5] to the server
  • Configure kdc-admin to treat the new KDC admin as a slave and replicate changes to it
  • In an announced window (probably a Tuesday morning at 7am), stop the Kerberos daemons on kdc-admin and the new kdc-admin.  Also put into maintenance mode.
  • Take a final dump of the Kerberos database from old kdc-admin, and copy it to kdc-admin-new
  • Disconnect old kdc-admin from the network
  • Rename kdc-admin-new to kdc-admin (this involves some twiddling with configuration management and a reboot, and possibly also lying to the sysadmin’s desktop using /etc/hosts)
  • Test password changes via kadmin.local
  • Get networks to update DNS
  • Run manual propagation pushes to each of the slaves
  • Take out of maintenance mode
  • Check that password changes via work
  • Check that password resets using the security question via work
  • Continue to monitor
  • Celebrate with pastries

What if it all goes wrong?

We roll back.  If we haven’t got as far as the DNS update, it’s as simple as turning old kdc-admin back on; if we have, we’ll need to follow the above procedure somewhat in reverse (disable access via webauth, turn off daemons, manual dump and propagate database to old kdc-admin, get networks to update DNS, turn everything back on).

What if a compromise is discovered and OxCERT need to randomize passwords really urgently?

We can perform this manually for them. But we’d really rather not have to do that.


This should be done at the end of July.  This should be a quieter time (being in the vacation), and it won’t affect people being able to log in – it will simply affect changes to accounts (so password resets, etc).


[1]  In an ideal world we’d be using a cross-realm trust, as there are various downsides to this sync method.

[2] We have a test account for this purpose, and it’s the only account TEST.OX.AC.UK can change the password of – so even if things go horribly wrong, we can’t inadvertently reset everyone’s live password from the test system!

[3] Normally we’d generate new keytabs as part of the system install (or hostname takeover).  Unfortunately, we’re working on the service that’s used to create keytabs, so we can’t do that here.

[4] This involves GPG, an encrypted USB key, and sneakernet.

[5] The stash file, per the previous blog post, contains the key used to encrypt the Kerberos database entries.  Without this, the server can’t read any of the data about principals (such as even whether they exist).

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Kerberos upgrades

Prompted by our colleagues in the Networks team, we will be posting a series of blog entries about the work that we’re currently undertaking to improve the University’s Kerberos infrastructure.

What is Kerberos?

I’m not going to try and explain Kerberos here – it’s been explained elsewhere on the internet far better than I can.  I recommend the “Explain like I’m 5” guide.  Wikipedia’s description is a bit technical.  And MIT have a dialogue about designing a system like Kerberos which is very readable.

The first (public) version of Kerberos was Kerberos 4.  The current version is Kerberos 5, which expands on the previous version and improves security, and this is the version we’re using.

Where do we use Kerberos?

Kerberos underpins Oxford’s Single Sign-On stack.  Your Oxford username is actually a Kerberos principal.  Kerberos underpins WebAuth (which is where most people will be familiar with it) – WebAuth basically implements the ticket part of Kerberos using cookies, and authentication is done against the Kerberos infrastructure.

Kerberos is also used by Nexus (although indirectly; it uses Active Directory which uses Kerberos, but it doesn’t hook directly into Oxford SSO. Instead passwords are synchronized), as well as for cross-realm trusts.

Other things Kerberos is used for in the University include:

  • LDAP
  • NFS
  • AFS
  • GSSAPI-protected web services
  • SSH
  • SMTP

What are some of the advantages of using Kerberos?

Single password

For each account, you only have a single password.  Note that you might have more than one account – for example, I might have a ‘ouit0144’ account for normal work, and an ‘ouit0144/itss’ account for carrying out more privileged tasks.

Single sign-on

Kerberos uses a ticket cache, so once you’ve authenticated to the KDC you can keep getting tickets to connect to new services without reauthenticating, as long as you’re within a given time period.  (For anyone thinking this sounds like WebAuth, that works in the same way – as I said above, it basically implements that aspect of Kerberos but using cookies.)

Your password never goes over the network

If you’re using kerberized software, you run ‘kinit’ or similar on your desktop.  which uses your password generate a key to (symmetrically) encrypt a timestamp, and sends it to the KDC.  The KDC validates that, and uses the same key (which it has stored in a database) to encrypt a response.  This means that your password never has to go over the network.

What will this work involve?

We’re dividing the work up into a series of individual tasks, both to make it more manageable and to make it easier for us to be confident that our changes aren’t breaking things (and if something does break, we only have a single change to look at, rather than a collection of changes).

In (approximate) order the tasks are:

  1. Upgrading kdc-admin to new hardware, new software and a different data centre
  2. Rekeying some “high-value” Kerberos principals (such as krbtgt/OX.AC.UK) to remove single DES
  3. Dropping single DES from the default list of encryption types offered
  4. Upgrading slave KDCs to newer software (and possibly new hardware)
  5. Enable incremental database propagation
  6. Wait for all user principals to be updated to not have single DES portions
  7. Disable single DES support entirely

We will be writing further blog posts to explain more these steps more fully.

Why are we doing it?

Single DES has been deprecated for a long time (NIST withdrew it as a standard in 2005), but in 2012 RFC6649 was published explicitly stating that DES should be considered weak.  MIT have also updated their Kerberos advice to say that DES is deprecated and should not be used.  Given all that, we’re looking to retire single DES across the OX.AC.UK realm.

Rekeying the krbtgt/OX.AC.UK principal will allow easier cross-realm trusts with Windows domains.  Currently, while krbtgt/OX.AC.UK supports stronger encryption types than single DES, they’re not supported by Windows.  Recent versions of Windows have become increasingly less happy about talking single DES, and rekeying will allow us to add strong encryption types supported by all systems (such as AES256).

kdc-admin is running software that is less supported than we would like, and so we want to take this opportunity to upgrade it to the latest version of Debian.  It’s also running a backported and patched version of Kerberos, which was required to get some functionality we needed – functionality that’s built-in in the latest version of Kerberos in Debian, so we won’t have the overhead of maintaining a separate package.

Currently when changes are made to principals they are pushed in bulk from kdc-admin to the slave KDCs.  This bulk dump and propagation runs every 5 minutes, and locks the database for a brief period while it takes place.  This causes problems for users and systems attempting to carry out actions on those principals (eg setting passwords, changing expiration dates, etc), and requires retrying the action.  Moving to incremental propagation should reduce the amount that the database needs to be locked, reducing the number of failures end-users see, and also reducing the number of incidents where we have to get involved to reconcile data. It should also lead to faster password changes.

When are we doing it?

Starting as soon as we can after the end of Trinity term.  While we are doing thorough testing, there will need to be downtime of services during maintenance periods while we carry out some of the work, and we would rather avoid that during busy times of the year (such as exam season).  We also need to give ITSS enough notice about major changes  to allow them to check their systems and make changes if required.

I think my services may require single-DES, what do I do?

Drop us a line at  We can have a look at the logs and the principals in question and tell you if you are currently using it, and work with you to mitigate the impact of the work.

Another reason for annual password resets

Annual password resets of user principals aren’t just for the reasons listed here – they also allow us to add new encryption types and remove deprecated encryption types from users’ Kerberos principals.  If we didn’t have the annual expiry policy in place, we would have to have more disruptive procedures when we needed to modify encryption types, such as forcing mass password expiries – not a move likely to make us popular!


This is not by any means a comprehensive list of terms related to Kerberos; however, it should help explain most of the terms mentioned here. See the links in the first section of this blog post for deeper explanation of the terms.

  • DES: Data Encryption Standard.  A type of encryption, now generally considered weak.
  • 3DES: encryption that applies DES three times to each block.  Stronger than DES.
  • KDC: Key Distribution Centre.  Generates Kerberos tickets and authenticates users.
  • kadmin: the Kerberos administrative daemon – the software that clients talk to in order to create, delete or modify principals (including password changes)
  • MIT: Original developers of Kerberos.  There are now more variants available (Heimdal is another open-source implementation, and Windows AD uses its own implementation it under the hood), but in Oxford we use MIT Kerberos.
  • Principal: an entry in the authentication database.  The most obvious case is usernames – eg ouit0144@OX.AC.UK – but there are other principals too, such as host/  They are qualified with a realm, and if you don’t have a realm the default realm is assumed (so here, OX.AC.UK).
  • Realm: an authentication administrative domain.  By convention, it is an upper-cased version of an organization’s DNS name.  In Oxford’s case, we use OX.AC.UK.  (Note that the realm is case-sensitive.)

Further posts

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Infrastructure and Hosting team leader vacancy

The Infrastructure and Hosting team is looking for a new team leader.  This post is open to both internal and external applicants, and is a permanent appointment.

The IAH team leader is responsible for providing technical leadership for the Infrastructure and Hosting team, so strong Linux/UNIX systems administration skills are a must, as well as the ability to line manage the team.

More details are available from the University’s recruitment site, and the closing date is the 4th March.

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